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Equal Opportunity, Not Equal Results:
Benign Racial Favoritism to Remedy Mere Statistical
Disparate Impact Is Never Constitutionally Permissible
Alamea Deedee Bitran*
“The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal.”
–Aristotle1
I. INTRODUCTION
Using a minimum height or weight requirement?2 Relying on
standardized test results or a selection committee for promotion or hiring
decisions?3 Refusing to hire people taking narcotics or with a documented
criminal background?4 Beware: you could be liable under Title VII5 for
disparate impact without a shred of discriminatory intent.
Title VII’s disparate impact provision is directly at odds with the Equal
Protection Clause6 and courts are incorrectly using it as the test for illegal
discrimination. Title VII’s disparate impact provision conflicts with the
Equal Protection Clause, as it mandates racial classification by imputing
liability based on racial proportions, forcing employers to make race-based
decisions.
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J.D. candidate, May 2016, Florida International University College of Law. An earlier version
of this paper earned First Place in the Pacific Legal Foundation’s March 2015 Law Student Writing
Competition. This version incorporates Supreme Court case law that was released after the competition.
1
CLAUDI ALSINA & ROGER B. NELSON, WHEN LESS IS MORE: VISUALIZING BASIC
INEQUALITIES xiii (2009).
2
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (finding a disparate impact on women from
minimum height and weight requirements for a correctional officer position).
3
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (opining that standardized test results for
promotion lacked a strong basis in evidence in that specific situation to prevail on a disparate impact
claim); Watson v. Fort Worth, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (finding subjective decision making from a selection
committee for promotion qualifies as a specific policy or practice under Title VII for disparate impact
liability).
4
See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (declining to find a disparate
impact on minorities when job applicants on narcotics were disqualified because the transit authority
rebutted statistics with the business necessity of needing alert employees to operate the transit system);
Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-00677, 2013 WL 1755664, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24,
2013) (finding a disparate impact on minorities from a criminal background check to determine
employment opportunities).
5
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The proper test for illegal discrimination that complies with the Equal
Protection Clause was set forth in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.7 In Yick Wo, the
Supreme Court found that to prevail on a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff
must provide evidence of discriminatory animus along with statistical
disparities.8 Statistical disparate impact alone was insufficient.9
Specifically, the Court opined that “whatever may have been the intent of
the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities . . .
with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by
the state of that equal protection of the laws.”10
In May 2015, in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
v. Inclusive Communities Project, the Supreme Court confirmed that within
the context of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to prevail on a disparate impact
claim, a plaintiff cannot merely show statistical disparities, and “a
disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the
plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that
disparity.”11 In its statutory interpretation of the viability of a disparate
impact claim under the FHA, the Court explained the importance of
maintaining a “robust causality requirement” because any more lenient
causation standard would allow defendants to “resort to the use of racial
quotas.”12
Although the Court’s Inclusive Communities Project decision was a
step in the right direction because it confirmed that a meritorious disparate
impact claim under the FHA must rely on more than just statistical
disparities, the Court’s decision was strictly a statutory one, thus leaving the
constitutional problem with disparate impact unresolved.13 In response to
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118 U.S. 356 (1886).
See id.
9
Id.
10 Id. at 373.
11 See 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015).
12 Id.
13 Inclusive Communities Project was a strictly statutory-based decision and the Court limited its
analysis to determining if disparate impact was a cognizable claim as provided for under the FHA. See
generally id. at 2516 (noting that it was engaging in a statutory analysis of the FHA, not a constitutional
analysis, the Court opined “[t]he issue here is whether, under a proper interpretation of the FHA,
housing decisions with a disparate impact are prohibited”); see also id. at 2521 (“Recognition of
disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA’s central purpose.”); id. at 2525 (“The Court holds
that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its resultsoriented language, the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress’
ratification of disparate-impact claims in 1988 against the backdrop of the unanimous view of nine
Courts of Appeals, and the statutory purpose.”); id. at 2519 (“Title VII’s and the ADEA’s ‘otherwise
adversely affect’ language is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s ‘otherwise make
unavailable’ language. In these three statutes the operative text looks to results. The relevant statutory
phrases, moreover, play an identical role in the structure common to all three statutes: Located at the end
of lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on disparate treatment, they serve as catchall phrases
looking to consequences, not intent. And all three statutes use the word ‘otherwise’ to introduce the
8
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the Inclusive Communities Project decision, legal scholar Roger Clegg
commented, “[g]iven that the Court was unanimous, then, in recognizing
the constitutional problems and bad policy results than can arise from the
disparate-impact approach, conservative litigators have no reason not to
continue to press courts to reject or at least limit the approach in other
cases.”14
Replacing merit-based selection, Title VII’s disparate impact provision
points a litigation revolver at employers, encouraging de facto quota
systems with preferential treatment based solely on race. The threat of
disparate impact liability incentivizes racial stereotyping and group based
discrimination, which is exactly what the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits.15 Title VII’s disparate impact provision incites Equal Protection
violations because “if the Federal Government is prohibited from
discriminating on the basis of race, then surely it is also prohibited from
enacting laws mandating that third parties . . . discriminate on the basis of
race.”16 As Chief Justice Roberts opined, “[t]he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”17 To be
constitutional, statutes should preclude “treatment of individuals as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”18
II. THE INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT DECISION’S LIMITS:
WHAT IT SOLVED AND WHAT IT LEFT UNADDRESSED

Suppose, for example, that the owner of an apartment complex decides
that she does not want to rent units to individuals who have been
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results-oriented phrase. ‘Otherwise’ means ‘in a different way or manner,’ thus signaling a shift in
emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions.”).
14
Roger Clegg, The Supreme Court’s Bad “Disparate Impact” Decision, NAT’L REV. (June 25,
2015, 3:00 PM), www.nationalreview.com/article/420319/supreme-courts-bad-disparate-impact-deci
sion-roger-clegg (“[T]he law is now better because Justice Kennedy himself recognizes that the
disparate-impact approach can lead to very bad results.”).
15
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Project on Fair Representation in Support of Petitioners, Mt.
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1507),
2013 WL 6040047.
16
See id. at 3 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations and quotations omitted)).
17
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
18
See City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
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Disparate impact liability under the FHA, although recently approved
under a statutory analysis, is unconstitutional as applied if courts allow
litigants to bring such claims solely based on statistical disparities without a
showing of discriminatory intent. By way of a hypothetical, an article
illustrated the problem with disparate impact if grounded solely in statistical
disparities:
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convicted of drug offenses. She makes that decision without regard to
race, her policy on its face does not treat people differently because of
race, and indeed she enforces it in an evenhanded way, so that it
applies equally to all applicants, without regard to race. Should she be
liable for racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act if it turns
out that the policy in her neck of the woods has a disproportionate
effect on this or that racial or ethnic group?19
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19
John Fund, The Supreme Court’s Disparate Impact Decision Is a Disaster, NAT’L REV. (June
26, 2015, 4:00 AM), www.nationalreview.com/article/420339/supreme-courts-disparate-impact-deci
sion-disaster-john-fund (quoting Roger Clegg).
20
Courts have grappled with the question of whether or not the FHA provides for disparate
impact liability for decades. See generally Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt.
Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011); Magner v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010); Charleston
Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (all being presented with the issue of whether the FHA provides for disparate
impact liability).
21
See generally Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015); see also Clegg, The Supreme Court’s Bad “Disparate Impact” Decision, supra
note 14 (“[T]he law is now better because Justice Kennedy himself recognizes that the disparate-impact
approach can lead to very bad results.”).
22
See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2516 (“The issue here is whether, under a proper
interpretation of the FHA, housing decisions with a disparate impact are prohibited.”).
23
See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013)
(granting certiorari); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting certiorari).
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Arguably, under the Court’s May 2015 Inclusive Communities Project
opinion, the answer to this hypothetical would be “maybe.” Under Inclusive
Communities Project, the Court recognized that the FHA does in fact
provide for disparate impact liability, a question that courts have grappled
with for decades.20
Inclusive Communities Project was a qualified victory for the
government because it upheld the viability of disparate impact claims under
the FHA pursuant to the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD) new regulations, but it also provided critical caveats that have left
the door open to eventually implement the appropriate constitutional test for
liability as proposed by this Comment.21 The Inclusive Communities Project
case was a statutory decision, not a constitutional one, as indicated by the
Court’s elaborate analysis of whether the FHA’s text and legislative history
provided for disparate impact liability.22
Prior to granting certiorari in Inclusive Communities Project, the Court
granted certiorari on two similar cases that questioned the constitutionality
of a disparate impact claim under the FHA, but both of those cases settled
before the Court could weigh in on the issue.23 In anticipation of Inclusive
Communities Project finally deciding the viability of disparate impact under
the FHA, commentators predicted that the Inclusive Communities Project
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case “could indirectly be the most important public school desegregation
case since Brown v. Board of Education.”24 Unfortunately, the Court did not
decide the constitutional question and limited its holding to whether the
FHA permits disparate impact liability, thus leaving the constitutionality of
disparate impact claims unaddressed.
In Inclusive Communities Project, the federal government provided
low-income tax credits that Texas’ Department of Housing and Community
Affairs (Department) distributed to developers.25 A non-profit organization,
the Inclusive Communities’ Project, Inc. (ICP), that assists low-income
families in finding affordable housing brought a disparate impact claim
under the FHA.26 The ICP alleged that the Department’s tax credit
distributions caused the continuation of segregated housing patterns by the
Department’s allocation of more credits to housing in inner-city areas and
too few credits in suburban areas.27
The FHA provides that it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person because of
race.” 28 Additionally, the FHA states:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in real estate-related transactions to discriminate
against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the
terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.29
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24
See Valerie Strauss, A Supreme Court Case That Public Education Advocates Should Be
Watching, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2015/01/13/
a-supreme-court-case-that-public-education-advocates-should-be-watching.
25
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2510.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
29
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
30
See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2519 (“Title VII’s and the ADEA’s ‘otherwise
adversely affect’ language is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s ‘otherwise make
unavailable’ language. In these three statutes the operative text looks to results. The relevant statutory
phrases, moreover, play an identical role in the structure common to all three statutes: Located at the end
of lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on disparate treatment, they serve as catchall phrases
looking to consequences, not intent. And all three statutes use the word ‘otherwise’ to introduce the
results-oriented phrase. ‘Otherwise’ means ‘in a different way or manner,’ thus signaling a shift in
emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions.”).
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Finding that the FHA’s “to otherwise make unavailable” language was
the functional equivalent of the Age Discrimination Employment Act
(ADEA) and Title VII’s “effects” language which provided for disparate
impact, the Court held that the FHA’s text provides for disparate impact
liability.30 The Court hypothesized that Congress did not use identical
language in the FHA as it did in Title VII and the ADEA, which explicitly
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provided for disparate impact with clear “effects” language because it
“would have made the relevant sentence awkward and unclear.”31
Additionally, interpreting the FHA to not provide for disparate impact
would render Congress’ various amendments to the FHA superfluous.32
The Court acknowledged the constitutional aspects at stake with
disparate impact claims but did not engage in a comprehensive
constitutional analysis, as it grounded its holding in the FHA’s statutory
allowance for disparate impact claims.33 Although the Court found that the
FHA authorized disparate impact, it importantly noted that the outer
contours of such claims must be limited by constitutional safeguards.34
The majority explained that
disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key
respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise
under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity. Disparate-impact liability
mandates the “removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers,” not the displacement of valid governmental policies. The
FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder their
priorities. Rather, the FHA aims to ensure that those priorities can be
achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or
perpetuating segregation.35

31
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Id.
Id. at 2520.
33
See id. at 2522.
34
See id.; see also Paul Hancock, Symposium: The Supreme Court Recognizes but Limits
Disparate Impact in Its Fair Housing Act Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 8:58 AM),
www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/paul-hancock-fha.
35
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
36
Id. at 2512 (emphasis added).
37
Id.
32
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Noting the constitutional limitations on disparate impact claims and
further supporting this Comment’s thesis that mere statistical disparities do
not pass constitutional muster, the Court held that “disparate-impact
liability has always been properly limited in key respects to avoid serious
constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, e.g., if such
liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical
disparity.”36
Providing a burden-shifting framework with a defense available to
those accused of disparate impact violations, the Court explained “[a]n
important and appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability
is properly limited is to give housing authorities and private developers
leeway to state and explain the valid interest their policies serve.”37
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Id. at 2523.
Id. at 2524 (“The limitations on disparate-impact liability discussed here are also necessary to
protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims. . . . Remedial orders that impose
racial targets or quotas might raise more difficult constitutional questions.”).
40
Id. (quotations omitted).
41
Id. at 2524.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 2526, 2529.
39
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Acknowledging that there are material differences between the FHA and
Title VII, and therefore supporting this Comment’s premise that disparate
impact claims supported solely by statistics are unconstitutional, the Court
stated “the Title VII framework may not transfer exactly to the fair-housing
context, but the comparison suffices for present purposes.”38 To guard
against abuse39 of disparate impact claims by holding individuals “liable for
racial disparities that they did not create,” the Court emphasized that “racial
imbalance does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact.”40 Noting that disparate impact is not without limits, the Court
instructed that the judiciary “should avoid interpreting disparate-impact
liability to be so expansive as to inject racial considerations into every
housing decision.”41
The majority’s opinion in Inclusive Communities Project left the
elephant in the room unanswered: is disparate impact constitutional? This
Comment argues that disparate impact, without requiring more than mere
statistics to form a cognizable claim, is unconstitutional, specifically in the
workforce. Supporting the proposition that disparate impact has no place in
the workforce under Title VII, Justice Thomas’ dissent opined that he
would not amplify the error from Griggs, which applied disparate impact to
Title VII.42 His dissenting opinion stated that the Inclusive Communities
Project majority’s basis for upholding the disparate impact regime “is made
of sand” and accused disparate impact proponents of “doggedly assum[ing]
that a given racial disparity at an institution is a product of that institution
rather than a reflection of disparities that exist outside of it.”43
Justice Thomas’ dissent highlights the unanswered concerns associated
with disparate impact. Specifically, constitutional concerns are especially
alarming when disparate impact claims are brought within the employment
context under Title VII, because multiple factors, not just race, tend to play
a role in employment-related decisions. Unrealistically attempting to isolate
employment decisions down to race being the sole reason for an employer’s
actions disregards other disparities that exist that might justify certain
employment decisions, such as different skill sets, education, or even
nepotism, all lawful reasons for employment decisions.
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III. RELEVANT SCHOLARSHIP & CASE LAW:
EQUAL PROTECTION & TITLE VII
Two legal scholars, Roger Clegg and Professor Richard Primus, have
attacked disparate impact and written scholarship on its unconstitutionality.
Roger Clegg opined that “the disparate impact theory continues to be used
in a manner that far exceeds the legitimate purpose of countering hidden
discrimination.”44 Disparate impact liability without proof of discriminatory
intent aims to mandate “equal results.”45 Conversely, the Equal Protection
Clause ensures “equal opportunity,” not “equal results.”46
To illustrate the problematic unconstitutional effect of disparate
impact, Roger Clegg explained:
If a business, agency or school has standards for hiring, promoting,
admissions or offering a mortgage that aren’t being met by individuals
in some racial and ethnic groups, there are three things that can be
done. First, the standards can be relaxed for those groups. That is what
racial preferences do. Second, the government can attack the standards
themselves. That is what the disparate-impact approach to enforcement
does. Third, one can examine why a disproportionate number of
individuals in some groups aren’t meeting the standards—such as
failing public schools or being born out of wedlock—and do
something about it.47

The disparate-impact approach pushes potential defendants to do one
or both of two things: Get rid of perfectly legitimate selection criteria
or apply those criteria in a race-conscious way so that the resulting
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44
Roger Clegg, Disparate Impact in the Private Sector: A Theory Going Haywire, 5
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGIS., REG. & LITIG. 12 (2001).
45
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
46
See generally Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970)
(“[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must
be given an equal opportunity to participate.”); United States v. Com. of Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 (4th
Cir. 1995) (“Women need not be guaranteed equal ‘results’ in this respect, but the Equal Protection
Clause does require equal opportunity to obtain these results.”); Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 647 F.2d 651, 665 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he equal
protection clause requires at least an equal opportunity for female athletes to play any contact sport.”).
47
Roger Clegg, “Disparate Impact at Harvard Law School”, CTR. FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
(Apr. 21, 2015, 08:00 AM), www.ceousa.org/issues/other-issues/disparate-impact/891-disparate-impactat-harvard-law-school.
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In another article in which he commented on the Inclusive
Communities Project decision, Roger Clegg emphasized the Catch-22
situation that disparate impact places employers in: either eliminate
innocent policies to avoid a lawsuit or start paying very close attention to
your racial proportions and adjust accordingly to avoid a lawsuit:
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racial double standard will ensure that the numbers come out right. In
other words, we’re supposed to stop judging people by the content of
their character, and start judging them by the color of their skin. And
the fact of the matter is, there is probably no selection criterion—not a
single one—that does not have a disparate impact on some group or
subgroup.48
Similarly, Professor Richard Primus reasoned that disparate impact
undoubtedly raises constitutional concerns.49 Specifically, he reasoned:
A statutory regime that directs government officials (overtly) and
private employers (tacitly) to monitor the racial composition of
workforces, and that is in some way concerned with the allocation of
employment opportunities among racial groups, does raise equal
protection issues on the currently prevailing understanding of equal
protection.50
This Comment joins scholarship such as Roger Clegg and Professor
Richard Primus by examining in depth disparate impact’s unconstitutional
effects and further analyzing the dangers of disparate impact permeating not
only the employment sphere, but now extending to other spheres such as the
housing and educational spheres.
A. Equal Protection Case Law

48

C M
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Roger Clegg, A Decision with a Disparate Impact Against Common Sense, WASH. EXAM’R
(June 29, 2015, 12:44 PM), www.washingtonexaminer.com/a-decision-with-a-disparate-impact-againstcommon-sense/article/2567234.
49
Richard Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493
(2003).
50
Id. at 585–86.
51 THOMAS BAKER & JERRE WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A NUTSHELL 394 (2d ed.
2003).
52
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
54
Id.
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The single most important constitutional principle that guards
individual rights is the concept of “equal protection of the laws,” found in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.51 The Equal
Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”52 Equal Protection,
via reverse incorporation through the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause, applies to both the federal government and the states.53 The Equal
Protection Clause does not mandate that everyone receive the same
treatment.54 Instead, it demands that similarly situated individuals are

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 77 Side B

06/27/2016 12:34:37

09 - BITRAN_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

FIU Law Review

436

6/12/16 11:52 PM

[Vol. 11:427

55

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

Id.
Id.
57
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
58
Id. at 314.
59
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
60
See Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 825 (2008) (opining that immutable
characteristics are “distinguishing” and define people “as a discrete group”).
61
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (reasoning “our cases
have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from ‘strict scrutiny’ at one extreme to ‘rational basis’
at the other”).
62
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
63
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995).
64
Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)).
65
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
66
Id.
56
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treated similarly.55 Both minorities and non-minorities can bring an Equal
Protection claim.56
Classifications that advantage or disadvantage one group of people
over another are reviewed with a certain level of scrutiny depending on the
type of classification made. When a classification “neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights,” it will be
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause “if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.”57 Rational basis review is the “paradigm of judicial
restraint.”58 In Railway Express Agency v. New York, the Court found that
New York’s advertisement restrictions were reasonable and satisfied
rational basis review.59
Racial classifications, however, are reviewed under a more stringent
standard. The strongest suspect class is race, as it an immutable
characteristic.60 Strict scrutiny, requiring more than reasonableness,
mandates that the classification be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
interest.61 When a classification is based on race, it invokes strict scrutiny
review, and the Equal Protection Clause frequently bans such a
classification as unconstitutional.62
The Supreme Court established that “all racial classifications
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly
scrutinized.”63 Strict scrutiny review of an Equal Protection claim “is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.”64
In Bakke, the Court, using strict scrutiny review, struck down a
medical school’s quota system that reserved sixteen out of one hundred
seats for minorities.65 The Bakke quota system violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the sixteen seats that were reserved for minorities were
completely off limits to white applicants.66 Minority applicants had access
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to all one hundred seats when applying, whereas white applicants only had
access to eighty-four seats.67
White applicants, though similarly situated to minority applicants
because they were applying to that medical school, were not given similar
opportunities, as the sixteen minority seats were entirely off limits to white
candidates.68 Justice Powell opined that “[p]referring members of any one
group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its
own sake.”69 The Court found that race can only be used as a “plus” factor,
but not the sole factor, when evaluating a student’s application.70
Additionally, Justice Powell emphasized the “importance of considering
each particular applicant as an individual.”71 He reasoned that the
“guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If
both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.”72
Building on its anti-quota precedent, the Court decided Gratz v.
Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger73 on the same day, altering the meaning
of “strict scrutiny” in the context of higher education. In Grutter, the
University of Michigan Law School sought to ensure diversity in its student
body, but when it denied a white applicant admission, she sued alleging
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.74 The Court
opined that “[a]ll government racial classifications must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”75 The Court found that the University
of Michigan Law School had narrowly tailored its admissions program
because the university considered race as one factor in its holistic view of
its applicants.76 Race was not the sole factor.77
That same day, the Court struck down the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate admissions program because it was not narrowly tailored to
the compelling interest of diversity.78 In Gratz v. Bollinger, two white
applicants sued after they were rejected by the University of Michigan,
alleging that they were qualified for admission but were rejected because
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they were white.79 The white applicants brought an equal protection lawsuit
because if they had been a minority with the same qualifications, they
would have been offered admission.80 The Supreme Court found that the
University of Michigan’s undergraduate program was allocating points to
minority applicants that would ensure their admission over their nonminority competitors.81 The University categorized African-Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans to be “underrepresented minorities” and
admitted “virtually every qualified applicant” if he or she was a member of
one of those ethnicities.82
The University used a point system to determine admissions.83 If an
applicant earned one hundred points, he or she was offered admission.84 The
University awarded twenty points to minority applicants just for being
African-American, Hispanic, or Native American.85 That one-fifth point
boost solely due to checking off an ethnicity box significantly increased
minority applicants’ chances of reaching one hundred points for
admission.86
Only twelve points were awarded to an applicant who had a perfect
SAT score.87 Additionally, only five points at most were awarded if an
applicant had artistic talents that “rivaled that of Monet or Picasso.”88 The
District Court opined that the twenty points allocated to minorities for being
minority members was “not the functional equivalent of a quota system
because minority candidates were not isolated from review by virtue of
those points.”89 The Supreme Court rejected the District Court’s
interpretation, and opined that for three years, the University’s admission
system “operated as the functional equivalent of a quota running afoul of
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion.”90
The Court struck down the admissions policy which “automatically
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee
admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely
because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in
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educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.” 91
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, racial classifications for high school district placement that were
based on race were invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause.92 The
school district’s allegedly compelling interest in diversity did not justify its
mechanical racial classifications.93 Additionally, the school district failed to
show that the racial classifications were necessary to achieve diversity.94
The Court emphasized the Grutter decision’s endorsement of diversity as a
compelling interest did not mean that diversity was “focused on race
alone.”95 Instead, diversity must encompass “all factors that may contribute
to student body diversity” such as “having overcome personal adversity and
family hardship.”96
Outside of the higher education context, racial classifications rarely
satisfy strict scrutiny review. In City of Richmond v. Croson, the Court
evaluated a City’s affirmative action plan which mandated contractors
subcontract at least 30 percent of its business to minority business
enterprises (MBE).97 The Court found that for an affirmative action plan to
comply with the Equal Protection Clause, there must be a specific finding
of past discrimination that the plan seeks to remedy.98 After determining
that the City did not have a history of past discrimination, the Court opined
that the plan was not narrowly tailored.99
Six years later in Adarand, the Court struck down an affirmative action
plan because the racial classification ran afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause and failed to satisfy strict scrutiny review.100 In Adarand, a
subcontractor that was not awarded a federal construction project
challenged the federal practice of giving contracts to minority
contractors.101 Emphasizing the importance of protecting “persons, not
groups,” the Court held that an affirmative action plan was not narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling interest.102
The Court found that “all governmental action based on race—a group
classification long recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrelevant and
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therefore prohibited’—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed.”103
Since Croson104 and Adarand,105 to comply with the Equal Protection
Clause, express racial classifications are only permissible in exceptional
circumstances and are subject to strict scrutiny review. Under Bakke, “racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for
the most exacting judicial examination.”106 Under Adarand, “any person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject
to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny.”107
B. Title VII Disparate Impact Case Law
Title VII provides for disparate impact liability in § 703(k)(l)(A):
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.108
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106
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
107
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
108
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 703(k)(l)(A).
109
See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations
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See id. at 1274–75 (citations omitted).
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To make a prima facie disparate impact case, a plaintiff must show that
“a facially neutral employment practice has a significantly discriminatory
impact.”109 Additionally, a plaintiff must show “statistical evidence of a
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused
the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
membership in a protected group.”110
When there is a disparate impact as a result of a facially neutral
employment practice, Title VII requires employers to articulate a business
necessity.111 Additionally, Title VII requires employers to demonstrate that
there are no equally effective ways to accomplish its goal without
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conferring a disparate impact.112
The Court’s first disparate impact case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
established that for a plaintiff to prevail, statistical evidence of disparate
impact must be accompanied by proof of discriminatory animus.113 In Yick
Wo, a San Francisco ordinance entrusted the “naked and arbitrary power” in
a board to decide which laundries were granted a license to use wooden
buildings.114 Approximately 200 Chinese laundry owners applied for
licenses but not one of them were granted a license by the board.115 In
contrast, all non-Chinese applicants for the laundry license except one were
granted a license.116 The Court concluded that the board’s actions were “so
unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State.”117
Additionally, the Court opined that although the law was facially neutral, it
was “applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand.”118 The circumstantial evidence that the petitioners presented
supported that the board was operating with a discriminatory animus when
it denied all 200 of the Chinese laundry owners’ applications for licenses.119
After the Court was unable to discern a reason for the license denials
“except hostility to the race and nationality,” the Court struck down the
ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause.120
In contrast to the Yick Wo constitutional discriminatory animus
requirement, Title VII disparate-impact laws prohibit “facially neutral . . .
practices that have significant adverse effects on protected groups . . .
without proof that . . . those practices” were “adopted with a discriminatory
intent.”121 An employer can incur liability under a Title VII disparate
impact theory when a facially neutral practice disproportionally impacts a
protected class.122
After Yick Wo, the Supreme Court addressed disparate impact under
Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,123 when plaintiffs challenged a high
school diploma employment requirement. The diploma requirement
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1964 Civil Rights Act took effect.”) (quotations omitted).
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disparately impacted African American potential applicants.124 To avoid
liability under Title VII, the company was required to show a “business
necessity” and that there were no less discriminatory alternative practices to
accomplish that business necessity.125 Without an explicit showing of
intent,126 the Court imposed disparate impact liability reasoning that the
diploma requirement was used as a proxy for race.127 The Court found that
the purpose of Title VII was to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.”128 Deviating from its Yick Wo rationale requiring a showing
of discriminatory animus, the Court held that “good intent or the absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups.”129
Criticizing the Court’s deviation from requiring a showing of
discriminatory animus for a disparate impact claim, Justice Thomas accused
the Court four decades later of building on bad precedent set forth in
Griggs, instead of overturning it.130 Justice Thomas cautioned, “[w]hatever
respect Griggs merits as a matter of stare decisis, I would not amplify its
error by importing its disparate-impact scheme into yet another statute.”131
Five years after Griggs, the Court declined to impose disparate impact
liability absent discriminatory animus in Washington v. Davis because the
defendants demonstrated that a standardized test was directly related to
necessary job skills.132 In Davis, white police officers scored higher than
African American police officers on a qualifying standardized test.133
The African American police officers brought a disparate impact claim
against the Metropolitan Police Department.134 The Court refused to allow
“a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of
government to pursue . . . invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”135
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The Court reasoned,
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.136
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The Court found that “government actions that are not undertaken for a
racially discriminatory motive but have a disproportionate adverse impact
on blacks do not trigger the ‘strict scrutiny’ that attends race-based
classifications.”137 After finding a rational basis for the police exam, the
Court held that the exam was valid.138 Building on its job related defense,
the Court found that a showing of job relatedness can rebut a disparate
impact claim supported solely by statistics. In New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, the Court found that the New York Transit Authority
successfully rebutted a disparate impact lawsuit.139 The Transit Authority
had a general policy of refusing to hire people who used narcotics.140
Plaintiffs claimed the policy disparately impacted minorities because
large amounts of minorities were on methadone, which disqualified them
from employment with the Transit Authority.141 In response, the Transit
Authority rebutted the lawsuit by showing that there was a business
necessity for the policy.142 The Transit Authority needed its workers to be
“persons of maximum alertness and competence” because the transit system
involved highly safety sensitive tasks.143 The Court found that the Transit
Authority rebutted the lawsuit and that the policy was not motivated by
racial animus.144
Approximately three decades after Davis,145 the Court faced a
momentous disparate treatment claim that originated from an employer’s
attempt to avoid liability under a disparate impact claim. In Ricci v.
DeStefano, seventy-seven New Haven firefighters took an exam for
promotion to lieutenant.146 Of the thirty-four candidates that passed, twenty-
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five were white, six were African American, and three were Hispanic.147 All
ten candidates that were eligible for promotion were white.148 As a result of
the white candidates outperforming the minority candidates, the minority
candidates threatened litigation.149 After public debate, the City of New
Haven discarded the test results fearing a disparate impact lawsuit.150
After the City decided not to certify the test results and denied the
passing candidates the right to promotion, seventeen white candidates and
one Hispanic candidate filed a disparate treatment lawsuit against the
City.151 The white firefighters argued that it is never “permissible for an
employer to take race-based adverse employment actions in order to avoid
disparate-impact liability.”152
The Court reasoned that discarding the test results was impermissible
unless the City could prove that it had a “strong basis in evidence that, had
it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute.”153 The Court qualified its holding by opining, “[w]e also do not
hold that meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the
Equal Protection Clause in a future case . . . we need not decide whether a
legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory
treatment under the Constitution.”154
The Court noted that the City lacked a strong basis in evidence to
believe it would lose if challenged with a disparate impact lawsuit.155
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that “a threshold
showing of a significant statistical disparity, and nothing more–is far from a
strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title
VII had it certified the results.”156 Kennedy wrote that the City could have
successfully defended a disparate impact lawsuit with a business necessity
and least discriminatory means showing.157
Additionally, the Court opined that Congress did not intend to provide
an exception for employers to discriminate via disparate treatment to avoid
disparate impact lawsuits:
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Allowing employers to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition
based on a mere good-faith fear of disparate-impact liability would
encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate impact. A
minimal standard could cause employers to discard the results of
lawful and beneficial promotional examinations even where there is
little if any evidence of disparate-impact discrimination. That would
amount to a de facto quota system, in which a “focus on statistics . . .
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate
prophylactic measures.” Even worse, an employer could discard test
results (or other employment practices) with the intent of obtaining the
employer’s preferred racial balance.158
IV. TITLE VII’S DISPARATE IMPACT PROVISION
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

[M]erely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to
confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparateimpact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection? . . .
[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be
waged sooner or later.161
The Court views governmental racial classifications skeptically
because they “can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice” and
“delay the time when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least

159
160
161
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Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2180 (2013).
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By imposing liability based on statistical disparities alone, Title VII
circumvents the Equal Protection Clause by eliminating a plaintiff’s burden
of proving discriminatory animus. Benign racial favoritism to remedy mere
statistical disparate impact alone is never constitutionally permissible.
Harvard Professor Richard Primus noted, “equal protection has become
hostile to government action that aims to allocate goods among racial
groups, even when intended to redress past discrimination.”159 After Ricci,
“Title VII’s disparate impact provision can withstand constitutional attack
only if it satisfies strict scrutiny—that is, if it is narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling government interest.”160
The Court has not analyzed the conflict between Title VII’s disparate
impact provision and the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Scalia opined in
his concurrence in Ricci that the Court’s decision:
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insignificant factor.”162
In Adarand, the Court reasoned that “[u]nless Congress clearly
articulates the need and basis for a racial classification, and also tailors the
classification to its justification, the Court should not uphold this kind of
statute.”163 Disparate impact liability violates the Equal Protection Clause,
as requiring proportional results in employment decisions is not narrowly
tailored.
A. The Injustices Perpetrated by Racial Favoritism Outweigh
Its Possible Benefits

162
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Professor Allan Ornstein opined that instead of remedying previous
injustices, when the federal government enacts affirmative action programs,
it fails “to recognize or admit that it is only perpetrating other injustices.”164
Ornstein opined that “by ignoring differences in qualifications, the federal
government is undermining the integrity and scholarly functions of the
university.”165 Illustrative of Ornstein’s thesis, Stuart Gould and Pierre Van
den Berghe conducted an affirmative action study in which they sent out
identical resumes to 176 graduate programs.166 The researchers created a
fictitious resume for a graduate student “ostensibly finishing up his/her
Ph.D. at the University of Washington.”167
The resume was distributed to all of the schools with the same
qualifications, and the only variables were the sex, race, and marital status
of the fictitious applicant.168 Half of the “applicants” volunteered their
ethnicity as “Afro-American” while the other half “made no mention of
ethnicity or race.”169 The affirmative action study found that of the ninetysix university replies, the schools that received the African-American
fictitious resume responded at 61.4 percent and followed up with a 44.4
percent active interest in pursuing that candidate.170
In contrast, of the schools that received the resumes of candidates that
did not specify an ethnicity, there was a 47.7 percent university response
rate with only a 9.5 percent active follow up rate.171 This study is illustrative
of the injustices that are perpetrated when employers or universities are
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pressured to accept a certain proportion of each race or ethnicity.
Additionally, accepting proportional amounts of each race arguably
does not achieve the “diversity” that the proponents of such affirmative
action programs claim they seek. A Stanford Alumni article explained “if
‘diversity’ were really the goal, then preferences would be given on the
basis of unusual characteristics, not on the basis of race. The underlying
assumption—that only minorities can add certain ideas or perspectives—is
offensive not merely because it is untrue but also because it implies that all
minorities think a certain way.”172 The article’s authors, Stanford Law and
the University of Chicago Law graduates, proposed alternative criteria to
race to achieve “diversity” such as grades, test scores, athletics, music,
clubs, leadership roles, and other extracurricular activities.173 The article
highlights that by implementing affirmative action programs, it works to the
disadvantage of the individuals such programs are designed to protect.174
The authors explained:
Perhaps the most tragic side effect of affirmative action is that very
significant achievements of minority students can become
compromised. It is often not possible to tell whether a given student
genuinely deserved admission to Stanford, or whether he is there by
virtue of fitting into some sort of diversity matrix. When people do
start to suspect the worst—that preferences have skewed the entire
class—they are accused of the very racism that justifies these
preferences. It is a strange cure that generates its own disease.175

Title VII’s disparate impact provision violates Justice Powell’s Bakke
opinion, in which he opined that “[p]referring members of any one group
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own
sake.”176 Mandating certain racial compositions goes against what the Equal
Protection Clause demands after Bakke, in which the Court “emphasized the
importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual.”177
Justice Powell found that the “guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied
to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection,
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then it is not equal.”178
Additionally, Title VII’s disparate impact provision violates Justice
Powell’s standard because the consequences of liability based on statistics
alone forces employers to accord more weight to minorities over nonminorities in promotional or hiring decisions. Like the University of
Michigan violated the Equal Protection Clause in Gratz179 by utilizing an
overly mechanical system as a way to determine admissions, Title VII’s
disparate impact provision unconstitutionally provides for liability absent a
showing of discriminatory intent.
Mechanically imputing liability based solely on statistics is not
narrowly tailored and runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Further
violating Equal Protection precedent, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case against an employer under Title VII’s disparate impact provision
solely on the basis of race, lacking the Grutter180 requirement of a “holistic”
review of the case.181
Correctly recognizing the importance in treating people as individuals
and not as members of a protected class, Justice Scalia opined that:
In my view, government can never have a “compelling interest” in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to “make up” for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction. . . . To pursue the concept of
racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of
purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In
the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.182

178
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90.
See Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
180
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003).
181
See Eang L. Ngov, When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact
Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
535 (2011).
182
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995).
183
Id.
184
Heather Mac Donald, Affirmative Disaster: A Duke Study Documents the Harm Racial
Preferences in College Admissions Can Do to the Intended Beneficiaries, WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 20,
2012), www.weeklystandard.com/articles/affirmative-disaster_626632.html.
185
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003).
186
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003).
179
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The distinction between goals and quotas “is a matter of semantics.”183
Further, scholars have opined that affirmative action programs actually hurt
the intended minority beneficiaries.184
Following the Gratz185 and Grutter186 precedent, the Equal Protection
Clause demands that Title VII’s disparate impact provision be found
unconstitutional. The proper test, which was set forth in Yick Wo, demands
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a showing of discriminatory intent to prevail on a disparate impact claim.187
C. Indications the Court Will Eventually Invalidate Title VII’s Disparate
Impact Provision

187
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See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
532 U.S. 275 (2001); John Martin, School Discipline and Disparate Impact, 13 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 30 (2012).
189
Alexander, 532 U.S. 275.
190
Id. at 286 n.6.
191
John R. Martin, Fourteenth Amendment––Equal Protection Clause––Political-Process
Doctrine––Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 128 HARV. L. REV. 281 (2014), http://cdn.har
vardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/schuette_v_bamn.pdf.
192
Adam Liptak, Court Backs Michigan on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/us/supreme-court-michigan-affirmative-action-ban.html?_r=0.
193
Greg Toppo, Affirmative Action Fading from College Scene, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2014,
6:01 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/12/black-history-affirmative-action/5432107.
194
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action Integration & Immigrant Rts. & Fight for Equal, by Any
Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2012) (en
banc).
188
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Although the Supreme Court has not expressly weighed in on the
constitutionality of Title VII’s disparate impact regulations, the Court
indicated that it would rule them invalid in Alexander v. Sandoval.188 In
Alexander, the plaintiff alleged that the driver’s license exams, which were
given in English, had a disparate impact on people not fluent in English.189
Justice Scalia opined that he could not help but notice “how strange it
is to say that disparate-impact regulations are ‘inspired by, at the service of,
and inseparably intertwined with’ § 601, when § 601 permits the very
behavior that the regulations forbid.”190
Further, in response to its legal problems with affirmative action
programs at the University of Michigan, Michigan voters supported a
proposition to amend its state constitution to prohibit affirmative action.191
Proposal 2 was an amendment to the Michigan constitution, which was
approved in 2006 by 58 percent of Michigan’s voters.192 Michigan Attorney
General Bill Schuette explained “our constitution requires equal treatment
in college admissions, which is an expression by 58% of Michigan voters in
2006 that says it is fundamentally wrong to treat people differently based on
race or the color of their skin.”193 The Sixth Circuit struck down Proposal
2.194
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld the
constitutionality of Proposal 2, which prohibited “preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or
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public contracting.”195 The Court concluded that via state amendment,
voters “may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in
governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”196
The highly publicized Schuette197 ruling was in line with the Ninth
Circuit’s logic from over a decade earlier, which also found that a state
constitutional ban on affirmative action did not run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause.198 In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, the Ninth
Circuit analyzed Proposition 209, an amendment to the California
Constitution.199 The proponents’ argument for passing Proposition 209 was
featured on the Ballot Pamphlet stating:
A generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to
prohibit discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil rights
movement. Instead of equality, governments imposed quotas,
preferences, and set-asides. Today, students are being rejected from
public universities because of their RACE. Job applicants are turned
away because their RACE does not meet some “goal” or “timetable.”
Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they are of the preferred
RACE. That’s just plain wrong and unjust. Government should not
discriminate. It must not give a job, a university admission, or a
contract based on race or sex. Government must judge all people
equally, without discrimination!200
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195
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rts. & Fight for
Equal, by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014).
196
Id. at 1630.
197
See id.
198
See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
199
Id.
200
Id. at 696–97 (emphasis added).
201
Id. at 699.
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Remaining faithful to Supreme Court precedent on judicial review, the
Ninth Circuit found California’s Proposition 209 constitutionally in line
with the Equal Protection Clause. The Court opined that “[a] system which
permits one judge to block with the stroke of a pen what 4,736,180 state
residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional
democracy.”201
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V. UNLESS THE COURT INVALIDATES DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER
TITLE VII, INDUSTRIES WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY THREATENED WITH A
LITIGATION REVOLVER SOLELY PREMISED ON RACIAL OUTCOMES
A. Disparate Impact’s Abuse Pursuant to Title VII in the Employment
Sphere
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202
Compare EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09cv2573, 2013 WL 4464553, at *11 (D. Md. Aug.
9, 2013) (opining that the idea of criminal background checks conferring a disparate impact is
“laughable”), with Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-00677, 2013 WL 1755664, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2013) (finding a disparate impact on minorities from a criminal background check
to determine employment opportunities).
203
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 5-561(b)(1)-(11) (West 2012) (requiring a criminal
background check on employees at a child care center, juvenile detention, school, foster care, recreation
center, camp, home health agency); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1-111 (West 2012) (requiring a criminal
background check on employees in public, private, vocational, and technical schools); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 489.518 (West 2004) (requiring a criminal background check on applicants for alarm system jobs);
Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-00677, 2013 WL 1755664 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2013);
see also Ingrid Cepero, Banning the Box: Restricting the Use of Criminal Background Checks in
Employment Decisions in Spite of Employers’ Prerogatives, 10 FIU L. REV. 729 (2015) (arguing the
validity of disparate impact claims arising from criminal background checks).
204 Brief Amici Curiae of Gail Heriot, Peter Kirsanow, and Todd Gaziano in Support of
Petitioner, Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011)
(No. 11-1507), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/
11-1507_pet_amcu_gh-pk-tg.authcheckdam.pdf.
205
Fund, supra note 19.
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The EEOC, DOJ, and individuals are using Title VII’s disparate
impact provision as a means of bringing disparate impact lawsuits across
industries. Lower courts are bombarded by disparate impact lawsuits
yielding various conflicting results.202 Further, many states have adopted
statutes authorizing the same practices that are frequently challenged by
disparate impact lawsuits. For example, numerous states have authorized
the use of criminal background checks for certain careers, yet under Title
VII, such background checks could incite a disparate impact lawsuit.203
Disparate impact lawsuits ultimately harm those that they seek to
protect because “[e]mpirical evidence suggests . . . that employers who are
discouraged from checking into the criminal backgrounds of job applicants
may simply avoid hiring from pools that they (correctly or incorrectly)
perceive as high risk.”204 An article noted that Title VII was never meant to
provide for disparate impact liability solely based on statistical disparities
and emphasized that mandating de facto quota systems detracts from what
should be the focus of employment related decisions: an applicant’s job
qualifications.205 Indicating that job qualifications, not race, should be the
focus of employment decisions, the co-managers on Title VII’s Senate
floor, Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, stated it “expressly protects
the employer’s right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white,
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No. 1:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013).
Id.
Id.
487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
Kaplan, 2013 WL 322116, at *4.
EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749, 752 (6th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Kaplan, 2013 WL 322116, at *12.
Kaplan, 748 F.3d at 754.
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must meet the applicable job qualifications. . . . Indeed, the very purpose of
Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than
on the basis of race or color.”206
In EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Education Corporation, the
EEOC brought a Title VII disparate impact lawsuit against Kaplan alleging
that Kaplan’s use of credit reports in its hiring process had a disparate
impact on black applicants.207 Kaplan chose to use credit reports as a means
of screening job applicants after Kaplan previously discovered system
breaches involving misappropriated funds by former dishonest
employees.208
Kaplan used credit checks to determine whether applicants were
“under financial stress or burdens that might compromise their ethical
obligations.”209 Referring back to Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,210
the district court opined that the EEOC would need to show (1) a specific
employment practice being challenged, and (2) establish with statistics that
the identified employment practice caused the exclusion of a group because
of their race.211
The EEOC attempted to use an expert witness who opined that more
black applicants were flagged for review than white applicants under the
credit check screening.212 Because they were flagged for their credit history,
the expert’s opinion was unpersuasive, as there was a legitimate explanation
for why those individuals were flagged.213
In granting summary judgment to Kaplan, the district court opined that
“[b]ecause plaintiff fails to present admissible evidence showing that the
use of credit reports ‘caused the exclusion of applicants . . . because of their
membership in a protected group,’ plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination.”214 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court, finding that “[t]he EEOC brought this case on the basis of a
homemade methodology, crafted by a witness with no particular expertise
to craft it, administered by persons with no particular expertise to
administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only by the witness
himself.”215
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In addition to the Kaplan216 case, the EEOC sued Peoplemark, alleging
that its policy of denying employment to applicants with felony records
conferred a disparate impact on African Americans.217 The alleged policy of
refusing to hire applicants with felony records did not even exist.218 The
magistrate judge granted Peoplemark fees and costs of $751,942.48.219
After the magistrate judge opined that the complaint “turned out to be
without foundation from the beginning,”220 the district judge adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation.221 The Sixth Circuit affirmed and
found that the EEOC’s disparate impact claim was “frivolous,”
“unreasonable,” and “groundless.”222
The Kaplan223 and Peoplemark224 cases are two examples of many in
which Title VII’s disparate impact theory can be abused and used to punish
facially neutral policies absent discriminatory intent. Extending Title VII’s
disparate impact liability to other statutes, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
has interpreted Title VII and the FHA to provide for disparate impact
liability.
Former Attorney General Eric Holder transformed the DOJ “into a
routine instrument of social and racial policy” using a “disparate impact
analysis to force racial adjustments on cities, police and fire departments
and banks.”225 The disparate impact lawsuits were brought without “proven
racial discrimination, as traditionally required[,]” and only used “arcane
statistical analyses.”226
B. Disparate Impact’s Alarming Extension into Schools Pursuant to
Title VII

216
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Id.
EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2013).
218
Id. at 587.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 589.
221
Id. at 590.
222
Id. at 592.
223 EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., No. 1:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116, at
*754 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013).
224
EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 58, 5844 (6th Cir. 2013).
225
Eric Holder’s Legacy of Politics, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2014, 7:52 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/eric-holders-legacy-of-politics-1411689140.
226
Id.
227
Clegg, A Decision with a Disparate Impact Against Common Sense, supra note 48.
217
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Title VII is frequently used by the DOJ as a basis for regulations on a
disparate impact theory.227 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601
provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 86 Side B

06/27/2016 12:34:37

09 - BITRAN_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

FIU Law Review

454

6/12/16 11:52 PM

[Vol. 11:427

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”228
Citing to Bakke,229 the Supreme Court noted that “only intentional
discrimination was forbidden by § 601.”230 To bring disparate impact
claims, the DOJ uses § 602, which authorizes federal agencies to enforce §
601 with regulations.231 The Court has cautioned against conjuring up
causes of action that are not authorized by statute by specifically stating that
“[a]gencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer
himself.”232
Although Title VII does not reference disparate impact or have an
“effects” language, the DOJ and the Department of Education are regulating
schools under a disparate impact theory pursuant to § 602. Specifically, §
602 states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate
the provisions of [§ 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the
objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken.

228
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42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
230
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280–81 (2001).
231
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see also Alexander, 532 U.S. at 275.
232
Id. at 291.
233
Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., Off. for C.R., The Transformed Civil Rights Data Collection
(CRDC) (Mar. 12, 2012), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-2012-data-summary.pdf.
234
Id.
235
Id.
229
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The Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) March 2012 statistics were
accompanied by a quote illustrating the DOJ’s mission to use mere statistics
to bring disparate impact claims. On the last page of its data collection
report, the CRDC quotes Arne Duncan, the United States Secretary of
Education: “The power of the Civil Rights Data Collection is not only in the
numbers themselves, but in the impact it can have when married with the
courage and will to change.”233
In a study comparing student enrollment rates to suspension rates
across the twenty largest school districts, the CRDC reduced students down
to their ethnicity as a defining sole characteristic.234 According to the
CRDC, Miami-Dade County has a student enrollment of 9 percent whites,
25 percent African American, and 65 percent Hispanic.235 The CRDC
alleges that Miami-Dade County suspends 4 percent whites, 50 percent
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African Americans, and 46 percent Hispanics.236 Based solely off of
statistics, the DOJ brings civil rights lawsuits against schools that receive
federal funding.237 When referring to statistics collected by the CRDC, U.S.
Secretary of Education Duncan claims: “[t]hose facts testify to racial gaps
that are hard to explain away.”238
Clegg cautions that disparate impact lawsuits will eliminate “perfectly
legitimate policies because they have politically incorrect results,” or
eliminate “the statistical imbalances through the use of surreptitious
quotas.”239 Disparate impact lawsuits now extending from Title VII into the
educational sphere will encourage less discipline or “school systems getting
their numbers right by punishing white students who ought to not be
punished or—more likely—by not disciplining black students who should
be.”240
Confirming Clegg’s policy concerns, a Pennsylvania elementary
school teacher, Allen Zollman, spoke out against the disparate impact
lawsuits at the United States Commission on Civil Rights meeting in
February 2011.241 Zollman explained the difficulties associated with making
sure the proportion of students disciplined were evenly distributed across
races:

Agreeing with Zollman’s concerns, political analyst Michael Barone
criticized disparate impact liability from disproportionate school discipline
statistics.243 Michael Barone reasoned,
236
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Id.
Id.
238
Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Remarks on the 45th Anniversary of “Bloody Sunday” at
the Edmund Pettus Bridge, Selma, Alabama (Mar. 8, 2010), www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2010/03/
03082010.html.
239
Roger Clegg, The Dangers of Disparate Impact, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2010),
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/20/the-dangers-of-disparate-impact-policy.
240
Id.
241
U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE & DISPARATE IMPACT (2011), www.usccr.gov/
pubs/School_Disciplineand_Disparate_Impact.pdf.
242
Id.
243
Michael Barone, The Perverse Effects of Disparate-Impact Doctrine, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 14,
2014), www.nationalreview.com/article/371083/perverse-effects-disparate-impact-doctrine-michael-barone.
237
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Ultimately each instance of misbehavior in the classroom is unique
and requires a customized response. It doesn’t matter what the
ethnicity of the student is. If the child acts out and creates a distraction
the other students will not learn. We’re talking about disparate impact.
For a teacher, what is the greater disparate impact? When one student
can say in effect, “indulge me or I will shut you down and there’s
nothing you can do about it,” then 29 other children are prevented
from learning. That is the greater disparate impact.242

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 87 Side B

06/27/2016 12:34:37

09 - BITRAN_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

FIU Law Review

456

6/12/16 11:52 PM

[Vol. 11:427

teachers and principals are now on notice that they may get into
trouble if they suspend or penalize black students in disproportion to
their numbers. It is not hard to imagine the likely results: quotas on
student discipline and a double standard, if, as appears likely, black
students misbehave at higher rates than non-blacks.244
Using Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas245 burden shifting framework,
once a school is accused of illegal discrimination with a disparate impact
lawsuit, the school is required to articulate a “substantial, legitimate
educational justification.”246
Individuals are now bringing disparate impact lawsuits against schools
if their children are suspended, claiming schools have a discriminatory
agenda against minorities.247 For example, Latwaska Hamilton alleges that
Hillborough County’s Benito Middle School was discriminating on the
basis of race when it asked her fourteen year-old son to transfer after four
suspensions.248
Michael Barone attacked the concept of disparate impact and its
unrealistic requirement that racial balances remain proportionate at all times
despite other variables such as different skill sets across races.249 He stated,
Ultimately, disparate-impact analysis rests on what ordinary citizens
instinctively recognize as a fiction, the notion that in a fair society you
would find the same racial and ethnic mix in every school, every
occupation, and every neighborhood. This runs against the sometimes
uncomfortable fact that abilities and interests are not evenly distributed
among ethnic and racial groups.250

244

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

Id.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
246
Ricardo Soto, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Off. for C.R., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Address
Before the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights’ Briefing on School Discipline & Disparate Impact (Feb. 11,
2011), in U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 241, at 55.
247
Zack Peterson, Federal Complaint Questions How Hillsborough Disciplines Minority
Students, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 29, 2014), www.tampabay.com/news/education/federal-complaintquestions-how-hillsborough-disciplines-minority-students/2186514.
248
Id.
249
Barone, supra note 243.
250
Id.
251
Gilman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 09-0468, 2014 WL 984309, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar.
14, 2014).
245
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Additionally, a professor brought a lawsuit on a disparate impact
theory claiming that a fence along the United States-Mexico border could
have a “disparate impact on lower-income minority communities.”251
Without Supreme Court guidance, there will be no stopping which
industries and institutions are threatened with a litigation revolver via
disparate impact lawsuits extending past Title VII.
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C. Disparate Impact’s Permeation of the Housing Sphere Under the FHA
In addition to unconstitutionally instating de facto quotas in schools,
the disparate impact revolver has now extended from Title VII to the
FHA,252 mandating “equal results” in the housing arena with the purported
blessing of the Supreme Court’s recent Inclusive Communities Project
case.253 When presented with the opportunity to evaluate a disparate impact
claim in the context of the FHA, the Court noted that there are
constitutional constraints to prevent quotas, but ultimately decided the case
on statutory grounds without explicitly providing a constitutional test for
disparate impact liability.254 After signing amendments to the FHA,
President Reagan cautioned:
I want to emphasize that this bill does not represent any congressional
or executive branch endorsement of the notion, expressed in some
judicial opinions, that title 8 violations may be established by a
showing of disparate impact of discriminatory effects of a practice that
is taken without discriminatory intent. Title 8 speaks only to
intentional discrimination.255

252
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42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2512 (2015).
254
Id. at 2512.
255
Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (Sept. 13, 1988), https://
reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1988/091388a.htm.
256
See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2512.
257
488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988).
258
Id.
253
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President Reagan’s qualifying statement noting that liability should
only attach to intentional discrimination is indicative of the precautions that
courts must take on disparate impact cases. In Inclusive Communities
Project, the Supreme Court opined that the text of the FHA provides for
disparate impact liability but more than mere statistical disparities are
required to prevail on such a claim to ensure that defendants do not resort to
the use of racial quotas.256
Over two decades before Inclusive Communities Project, in Town of
Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, the Court affirmed the Second
Circuit’s finding of disparate impact liability under the FHA.257 Oddly, the
Court qualified its holding suggesting the Court did not entirely agree with
allowing for disparate impact liability.258 The Court explained that it agreed
with the appellate court’s finding of disparate impact liability because the
defendant could not offer a legitimate reason for refusing to amend a zoning
ordinance. Notably, the Supreme Court opined that it did not necessarily
agree with the appellate court’s test for disparate impact, but that liability
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was so glaring within the context of the facts of that case that it affirmed the
appellate court:
Since appellants conceded the applicability of the disparate-impact test
for evaluating the zoning ordinance under Title VII, we do not reach
the question whether that test is the appropriate one. Without
endorsing the precise analysis of the Court of Appeals, we are satisfied
on this record that disparate impact was shown.259
A district court has even stated that a disparate impact claim was
“nothing more than wishful thinking on steroids.”260
VI. WHAT IS THE “MORE” THAT IS NEEDED TO MAKE A DISPARATE
IMPACT CLAIM BASED ON STATISTICS CONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?

Id.
See Lawrence Hurley, Court Rejects Obama Housing Bias Rule as “Wishful Thinking”,
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2014), http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0IN24C20141103?irpc=932.
261
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
262
See infra Section V(B) discussing disparate impacts abuse in the education sphere.
263
See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
260
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Disparate impact based solely on statistics runs afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause and the Court’s Yick Wo decision which required a
showing of discriminatory animus for a disparate impact claim.261 Because
the facts of every case differ, and there are many different ways a plaintiff
can show discriminatory animus, this Comment does not have a formula
that conveniently contours the specific parameters for determining when a
claim is constitutionally permissible and when it is not. That would be
unrealistically attempting to draw arbitrary lines in the sand.
Instead, this Comment proposes that mere statistics are absolutely
never constitutionally permissible, no matter how noble the purpose of the
benign favoritism might be. That is the outer limit of what never constitutes
a constitutional disparate impact claim. An example of this outer limit
would be claims that rest solely on statistical disparities, such as the claims
discussed in Section V(B) of this Comment being brought against schools
when a disproportionate number of one racial group is assigned more
detentions than another racial group, are never constitutionally
permissible.262
Some claims that might satisfy the “something more” in addition to
statistical disparities to indicate discriminatory animus would have to be
similar to the standard set forth in Yick Wo.263 Section III(B) of this
Comment discusses Yick Wo, and that the Court found that in addition to
alarmingly one sided statistics, the “conclusion cannot be resisted that no
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Id. at 374.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
266 See Johnson v. City of Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Courts assess the
viability of these claims using a three-step burden-shifting framework akin to the familiar McDonnell–
Douglas standard.”); Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (“In disparate-impact cases under Title VII, we apply a
different version of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework than in disparate-treatment
cases. We follow the same three steps: the plaintiff states a prima facie case; the defendant responds; the
plaintiff rebuts the response.”).
267
See Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass’n, 760 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2014) (using a
burden shifting framework similar to McDonnell Douglas to evaluate a disparate impact claim).
268
See infra Section V(B).
269
See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
270
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
265
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reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong.”264 Therefore, if there is no other possible lawful
explanation for the statistical disparities other than discriminatory animus,
then a disparate impact claim could satisfy the Equal Protection Clause’s
demands.
Once a plaintiff satisfies the constitutional safeguard of “something
more” to show a defendant’s discriminatory animus, not just statistical
disparities, this Comment urges courts to adopt a burden shifting framework
similar to the one established in McDonnell Douglas to evaluate the
claim.265 Although the McDonnell Douglas framework is traditionally a
model for disparate treatment, some courts have already adopted a similar
framework within the disparate impact context, as it allows courts to
“consider the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect
against the strength of the defendant’s interest in taking the challenged
action.”266
If a plaintiff brings a constitutionally permissible disparate impact
claim, a defendant should be able to defend with a “sufficient business
interest in the disputed practice.”267 Once a defendant presents a legitimate
reason, such as: (1) all students who disobey classroom rules are disciplined
regardless of their race,268 (2) we do not want to hire people that are on
narcotics to operate trains regardless of their race,269 or (3) we promote
people who perform the highest on job-related standardized tests regardless
of their race,270 the burden will shift to the plaintiff to show that the
purported legitimate reason is actually pretext for discrimination. Only then,
if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant’s legitimate reason is pretext for
discrimination, can a plaintiff prevail on a disparate impact claim.
Unfortunately, the Court continues to dance around the constitutional
implications of disparate impact claims by deciding cases on statutory
grounds instead of head on addressing if such claims are constitutional, as
seen in both Inclusive Communities Project and Ricci. In Inclusive
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Communities Project, the Court explained that disparate impact is not
immune from constitutional constraints.271 The Court opined in Inclusive
Communities Project, “[w]ithout adequate safeguards at the prima facie
stage, disparate-impact liability might cause race to be used and considered
in a pervasive way and ‘would almost inexorably lead’ governmental or
private entities to use ‘numerical quotas,’ and serious constitutional
questions then could arise.”272 In Ricci, the Court noted “[o]ur statutory
holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken here in
purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that meeting the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause
in a future case.”273
Justice Scalia’s Ricci concurrence hit the nail on the head: the Court’s
“resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court
will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”274
VII. CONCLUSION
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271
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2523 (2015).
272
Id.
273
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009).
274
Id. at 594.
275
See Brief for Project on Fair Representation et al., supra note 15.
276
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
277
See Disparate Scalia, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:00 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/
disparate-scalia-1421971209.
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In conclusion, Title VII’s threat of disparate impact liability
incentivizes racial stereotyping and group based discrimination in
employment, which is exactly what the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits.275 The Equal Protection Clause ensures equal opportunity, not
equal results.
The constitutionally appropriate test for disparate impact was
established in Yick Wo, which required a showing of discriminatory intent,
not just mere statistical disparities.276 Although intent can arguably be
challenging to prove, that is not a reason for holding employers
unconstitutionally liable for discrimination under a disparate impact theory.
Statistics absent a showing of discriminatory intent should be outright
rejected as conceivable disparate impact claims and found unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause because one type of racial bias cannot be
remedied by another.277 A Wall Street Journal editorial explained that
unless disparate impact is eventually found unconstitutional,
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Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
280
Id.
281
Id. at 702.
282 Griggs was a seminal case that endorsed disparate impact liability in the employment context
pursuant to Title VII.
283
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2531
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
284
Brief for John. R. Dunne, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2014) (No. 13-1371), 2014
WL 7405726.
279
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“municipalities, landlords, bank lenders, you name it, will inevitably adopt
tacit racial quotas to ensure the numbers work out and thus avoid a possible
HUD drive-by.”278
Like Parents Involved in Community Schools,279 where a school board
violated the Equal Protection Clause by not narrowly tailoring its means of
achieving diversity, Title VII’s disparate impact provision is not narrowly
tailored to a compelling interest. Although there is an argument to be made
drawing similarities between diversity being a compelling interest in the
employment and higher education realms, such an argument falls short
when looking at the underlying goals of both institutions. The employment
realm, unlike higher education, lacks the inherent need for diverse views to
broaden classroom teaching of young minds. Instead, the employment
sphere is more akin to the Parents Involved in Community Schools
generalized situation, in which using race alone to achieve diversity was not
narrowly tailored to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause.280 The Court
opined in Parents Involved in Community Schools that diversity cannot be
achieved by focusing on race alone, and instead must incorporate other
factors such as adversity.281
Title VII’s disparate impact provision focuses liability solely on race,
and although diversity is in some contexts a compelling interest, such
generalized and mechanical racial classifications are not narrowly tailored.
Unless invalidated, Title VII’s disparate impact provision will continue to
unconstitutionally threaten employers solely based on statistics and
continue extending beyond Title VII into the education and housing
spheres. As Justice Thomas noted, “[t]he decision in Griggs282 was bad
enough, but this Court’s subsequent decisions have allowed it to move to
other areas of the law.”283
Proponents of disparate impact are attempting to connect
disproportionate results in school discipline to disproportionate results in
the housing sphere. For example, an amicus brief in support of the
Petitioners in the Inclusive Communities Project case stated “racial isolation
in schools is directly connected to racial isolation in housing patterns.”284
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Unless the Court invalidates disparate impact on constitutional grounds,
disparate impact proponents will continue to infiltrate the employment
sphere with litigation solely based on statistical disparities. By
mechanically imposing liability from statistics showing disproportionate
race-based results, Title VII’s disparate impact provision in itself violates
the constitutional right to equal protection.
When Title VII’s disparate impact provision is eventually challenged,
the Court should find disparate impact based solely on statistics
unconstitutional. Without proof of discriminatory animus, as indicated by
Yick Wo, disparate impact encourages impermissible and unconstitutional
quotas in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. An attack on one
amendment’s scope, is inadvertently an attack on every amendment, leaving
the entire constitution possibly to be picked apart for scraps and burned to
the ground. There is absolutely no lawful justification for making any class
of people’s rights more worthy of protection than others.
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